






















he recent global financial crisis underscored 
the important role of banks and other finan-
cial institutions in transmitting and amplifying 
economic and financial shocks. The responses of 
banks, especially in the United States and Europe, 
to substantial decreases in their capital positions 
helped to turn the initial shock to the U.S. subprime-
mortgage market into a global cataclysm.
1 These 
forces, which peaked after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, are viewed as key determinants in the 
collapse of aggregate expenditure in the autumn of 
2008 and the resulting large contraction in employ-
ment and output. Understanding these phenomena 
and their implications for public policy is important 
and requires the use of a macroeconomic framework 
in which financial intermediation matters for resource 
allocation.
This article investigates the influence of bank capital 
on economic fluctuations, using a macroeconomic 
framework that incorporates an explicit role for finan-
cial intermediation. The analysis focuses on the role 
of bank capital in the amplification and propagation 
of shocks and examines how weaker bank balance 
sheets can make an economy more vulnerable to 
adverse shocks. It also studies how new macropru-
dential initiatives such as countercyclical capital buf-
fers—whose purpose is to make the banking sector 
more resilient to stress—will affect the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy and other shocks to 
the real economy.
The first section of the article summarizes the 
macroeconomic models of Meh and Moran (2010) 
and Christensen, Meh and Moran (2010) that incor-
porate a banking sector. The second section shows 
how endogenous movements in bank capital—the 
bank-capital channel (see Box)—can amplify and 
1  Note that the loss of liquidity in financial markets also contributed to the 
severity of the crisis.
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and fourth sections respectively examine how the 
transmission of shocks depends on the capitaliza-
tion of the banking system and how financial shocks 
originating in the banking sector can substantially 
affect the real economy. The fifth section illustrates 
the important implications that countercyclical cap-
ital buffers could have for the transmission and the 
magnification of shocks.
2 The last section concludes 
by highlighting areas where further research is 
needed. Indeed, this article abstracts from elements, 
such as boom-bust dynamics and associated non-
linearities that may be important in the discussion 
of the relationship between bank balance sheets 
and the transmission mechanism. The article should 
therefore be viewed as a useful first step in under-
standing the interaction between bank capital and 
the transmission mechanism, as well as the implica-
tions of countercyclical capital buffers for monetary 
policy.
A Macroeconomic Framework 
with Banking
This section outlines the macroeconomic framework 
with banking that is used to analyze the role of bank 
capital in economic fluctuations. This framework, 
based on Meh and Moran (2010) and Christensen, 
Meh and Moran (2010), is particularly suited to this 
exercise since the condition of bank balance sheets 
is determined endogenously through the important 
role of bank capital in mitigating asymmetric-
information problems between bankers and their 
creditors.
3
The model includes several nominal and real fric-
tions, in the spirit of standard New Keynesian 
models (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005).
4 
Households choose their consumption and leisure to 
maximize expected lifetime utility and deposit their 
savings in banks.
5 Monopolistically competitive firms 
use capital and labour to produce differentiated 
2  Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin (2010) examine the evolution of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism over time.
3  This model was used to contribute to policy debate at the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS 2010) and the Bank of Canada (Bank of 
Canada 2010).
4  Following the crisis, many papers emerged to take into account the 
balance sheets of banks in New Keynesian models. See, for example, 
Dib (2010); Van den Heuvel (2008); Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2011); and 
Gertler and Karadi (2011). Also see de Resende and Lalonde (this issue) 
for the use of the Bank of Canada Global Economic Model augmented 
with banking (BoC-GEM-Fin) and Aikman and Vlieghe (2004).
5  In the model, households do not face financial frictions. Examples of 
models where households face collateral constraints include Iacoviello 
(2005) and Christensen (this issue). Building models that feature both 
bank capital and household balance sheets is left for future research. 
intermediate goods and face sticky prices. These 
differentiated intermediate goods are then assem-
bled by competitive firms to obtain the final good. 
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule 
with interest rate smoothing. Such a rule stipulates 
that the monetary authority adjusts the policy rate 
gradually in response to deviations of the inflation 
rate from the target and the output gap.
Entrepreneurs require external funds to make 
investments. As a result, banks intermediate funds 
between households (dispersed depositors, the 
ultimate lenders) and firms (entrepreneurs, the 
ultimate borrowers).
6 This intermediation process, 
however, is complicated by two sources of moral 
hazard. The first affects the relationship between 
banks and firms and arises because firms may 
choose to invest in risky projects that yield private 
benefits but have a low probability of success. The 
second source of moral hazard pertains to the rela-
tionship between banks and households, and stems 
from the fact that banks (to which households dele-
gate the monitoring of firms) may not monitor appro-
priately, since monitoring is costly and not publicly 
observable.
The solution to the model involves an optimal config-
uration of financial contracts under asymmetric infor-
mation, building on the seminal work of Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1997).
7 Banks spend resources to monitor 
the behaviour of firms and require that firms invest 
their own funds (net worth) in projects. In turn, a higher 
level of bank capital lessens the moral-hazard problem 
between banks and depositors, and thus the banking 
sector faces less-stringent conditions in its funding 
market. Since raising new bank capital is costly (see 
Box), bank capital is determined, in the short run, 
primarily by retained earnings (internal funds).
In Meh and Moran (2010), the capital-asset ratio 
necessary to mitigate the asymmetric-information 
problems is determined solely through market disci-
pline. In contrast, Christensen, Meh and Moran (2010) 
allow for an exogenous regulatory capital requirement 
that can be time varying to increase the resilience of 
the banking system. The model can therefore accom-
modate countercyclical capital buffers (such as those 
in Basel III) whereby banks are required to maintain 
a higher capital-asset ratio in good times than in bad 
times. Under such a rule, banks can draw down their 
6  The present framework focuses on the traditional loan book and not on 
capital-market activities.
7  This optimal financial contract stems from a principal-agent problem 
featuring a moral-hazard issue, in that bank actions are not publicly ob-
servable. Because of this asymmetric information, the Modigliani-Miller 
theory does not hold in the model. 
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which monetary policy actions or other shocks 
affect bank lending by their impact on bank cap-
ital. Van den Heuvel (2007a) was one of the first 
authors to highlight this channel in the context 
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
Shocks to aggregate demand and supply, as well 
as conditions in real estate markets, may influence 
loan losses (or loan values) and, if not buffered 
by profits, can affect the level of bank capital. 
Adverse (favourable) shocks to the balance sheets 
of banks or financial institutions can entail sharp 
contractions (expansions) in credit, which can in 
turn magnify the effects of such shocks on output 
and inflation (Figure A). For example, after nega-
tive shocks, banks deleverage by reducing bank 
lending, which is achieved by tightening their loan 
standards and increasing credit spreads. 
Two broad factors contribute to the strength of 
this channel. First, some borrowers are highly 
dependent on banks or financial institutions for 
credit. This dependence implies that if the supply 
of bank loans is severely disrupted, these bor-
rowers face sizable difficulties and costs in finding 
and forming relationships with new lenders, and 
must therefore curtail their expenditures. The 
second factor is the difficulty that banks face 
in trying to fully insulate their supply of lending 
in response to such shocks, given the difficulty 
of raising capital, especially in times of financial 
stress. The costs of raising capital can come, for 
example, from adverse-selection problems and 
possible pecuniary costs associated with share 
purchases and equity issuances (Jermann and 
Quadrini forthcoming).
The bank-capital channel resembles the theory of 
the financial-accelerator mechanism (Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore 
1997). But they are inherently different: the bank-
capital channel focuses on how the balance 
sheets of banks constrain the supply of credit, 
while the financial-accelerator mechanism focuses 
on how the balance sheets of the ultimate bor-
rowers constrain the amount they are able to 
borrow.
Although this article does not aim to explain 
the recent subprime-mortgage market crisis, it 
is interesting to observe that the bank-capital 
channel studied here can qualitatively replicate 
some of the broad dynamics of the recent crisis. 
For example, the fall in the perceived quality of 
banks causes a prolonged deterioration in bank 
capital, a tightening of loan standards, a rise in 
credit spreads, a fall in bank lending, and a sub-
sequent persistent drop in output. The model, 
however, is silent on the role of liquidity problems 
in the severity of the crisis.
The Bank-Capital Channel: An Illustration
Figure A:  Illustration of how a shock to bank capital affects the economy
Source: Adapted from Bayoumi and Melander (2008) 
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operating with less pressure to reduce assets. In the 
exercises that follow, the time-varying capital require-
ment is adjusted in response to the credit gap (devia-
tion of private credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-run 
trend). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
recently advocated the credit gap as a useful indicator 
of financial vulnerability.
8 
The Importance of the 
Bank-Capital Channel in the 
Amplification and Propagation 
of Shocks
To isolate the role of bank capital in the transmis-
sion of shocks we conduct a hypothetical policy 
experiment, comparing the economic responses 
following adverse economic shocks under two 
scenarios. The first scenario features an active bank-
capital channel, where endogenous movements in 
bank capital affect the amount of loans made.
9 The 
second scenario is similar to the first, except that 
the bank-capital channel is turned off by removing 
the asymmetric-information problem between 
bankers and their creditors. In this experiment, the 
capital requirement is market determined (Meh 
and Moran 2010). The results of this policy experi-
ment are illustrated in Chart 1, which presents the 
effects of a one-standard-deviation adverse shock to 
productivity.
10
Based on a reasonable calibration, the key result is 
that the bank-capital channel amplifies and propa-
gates the effect of shocks on output, investment, 
bank lending and inflation. Indeed, when the bank-
capital channel is active, the peak decline in bank 
lending is twice as large, and the decline in output 
is much more pronounced. Further, the adverse 
productivity shock has longer-lasting effects on the 
economy: under an active bank-capital channel, 
it takes about 13 quarters for the impact of the 
shock on bank lending and output to bottom out, 
8  For simplicity, the countercyclical capital buffers in the model depend 
only on the credit gap. In practice, they may depend on other variables, 
such as asset prices and credit spreads, and be activated only occa-
sionally (Chen and Christensen 2010).
9  This is the baseline economy in Meh and Moran (2010). The monitoring 
cost, which dictates the degree of asymmetric information between 
bankers and their creditors, is calibrated to be in the range of the esti-
mate of the ratio of bank operating costs to bank assets for developed 
economies (Erosa 2001). For further details on the calibration, see Meh 
and Moran (2010).
10 The size of the shock measured in percentage points is the same under 
the two scenarios. The monetary policy rule is assumed to remain the 
same under the two scenarios.
as opposed to 8 quarters otherwise. Moreover, the 
upward pressure on inflation that typically results 
from an adverse productivity shock is markedly 
higher when the bank-capital channel is present than 
when it is not. This is because the decrease in bank 
lending is greater in the presence of the bank-capital 
channel, and this in turn compounds the effects on 
output and inflation. These results are broadly con-






The amplification of shocks through the bank-capital 
channel results primarily from the emergence of 
feedback effects. After a disturbance that causes a 
decrease in economic performance, such as a pro-
ductivity shock, an adverse feedback loop emerges, 
where falling profitability and asset values lead to 
increased loan losses in the banking sector. The loan 
losses cause a decline in bank capital, leading the 
banking sector to face more-stringent conditions 
in its own funding markets. This disruption in finan-
cial intermediation leads to a further drop in output, 
investment and asset prices.
11 Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) show that decreases in the capitaliza-
tion of Japanese banks in the late 1980s adversely affected economic 
activity in regions where these banks had a major presence. Moreover, 
bank-level data (Kishan and Opiela 2000; Van den Heuvel 2007b) 
indicate that poorly capitalized banks reduce lending more significantly 
following monetary policy contractions. Finally, Van den Heuvel (2002) 
shows that U.S. states with banking systems that are less capitalized 
are more sensitive to monetary policy shocks.
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Capital on Economic Activity
We now consider the effects of a financial shock 
that decreases the net worth of banks. Such a shock 
could result from a fall in the perceived quality of 
their assets (Gertler and Karadi 2011). In the following 
experiment, the size of the shock is a 5 per cent 
decline in asset quality to roughly match the broad 
dynamics of the U.S. subprime-mortgage shock. The 
results are displayed in Chart 2.
The key finding from this policy experiment is that 
shocks originating in the banking sector can have 
significant and long-lasting macroeconomic effects. 
As illustrated in Chart 2, the sudden deterioration of 
bank capital causes a decline in banks’ capital-asset 
ratios. To restore these ratios to their targeted levels, 
banks endogenously deleverage by tightening loan 
standards, which leads to a decrease in lending.
The resulting “credit crunch” directly affects invest-
ment expenditure within the economy, and asset 
prices come under pressure. The reduction in invest-
ment spending and asset prices leads to a reduction 
in incomes (household income, aggregate output 
and business profits) through standard economic 
multiplier effects and wealth effects. These nega-
tive impacts then affect loan values and bank cap-
ital, sparking a further round of deleveraging. Thus, 
because of this adverse feedback loop, the final 
effect of a negative shock to banks’ balance sheets 
on aggregate economic activity can be significantly 
and persistently larger than the initial direct effect.
Chart 1:  Economic response to an adverse productivity shock in the presence of the bank-capital channel
Deviation from steady state
Source: Adapted from Meh and Moran (2010) 














Chart 1:  Economic responses to an adverse productivity 
shock in the presence of the bank-capital channel
Deviation from steady state
a. Output
 Economy with no bank-capital channel
 Economy with bank-capital channel
Source: Adapted from Meh and Moran (2010) 









 Economy with no bank-capital channel
 Economy with bank-capital channel
Chart 1:  Economic responses to an adverse productivity 
shock in the presence of the bank-capital channel
Deviation from steady state
c. Short-term interest rate
Source: Adapted from Meh and Moran (2010) 









Chart 1:  Economic responses to an adverse productivity 
shock in the presence of the bank-capital channel
Deviation from steady state
b. Infl  ation
 Economy with no bank-capital channel
 Economy with bank-capital channel












1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36
Quarters
Chart 1:  Economic responses to an adverse productivity 
shock in the presence of the bank-capital channel
Deviation from steady state
d. Bank lending
 Economy with no bank-capital channel
 Economy with bank-capital channel
Source: Adapted from Meh and Moran (2010) 
 Economy with no bank capital channel  Economy with bank capital channel
27 
BANK BALANCE SHEETS, DELEVERAGING AND THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SUMMER 2011Economic Response to Shocks 
and the Capitalization of the 
Banking System
The previous sections show that endogenous 
movements in bank capital amplify and prolong 
the adverse effects of shocks on the economy. The 
following question then emerges: Can a high level of 
bank capital mitigate this amplification mechanism 
when the bank-capital channel is active?
To examine this question, we conduct a third policy 
experiment, contrasting the responses to shocks 
when the banking sector has more capital with those 
when the banking sector has less capital (baseline in 
the previous sections). The capital-asset ratio in the 
banking sector with more capital is set exogenously 
to be twice as large as that in the banking sector 
with lower capital.
12 The monetary policy rule is still 
assumed to be the same for both scenarios. From 
the results reported in Chart 3, the outcome is clear: 
an economy with a banking system that has more 
capital is better able to absorb the adverse effects 
of shocks on bank lending, output and inflation. As 
illustrated in Chart 3, this is because the drop in 
bank lending after the shock is much smaller in the 
economy with abundant bank capital. When the 
banking system has more capital, bank lending and 
output tend to fall by about 5.2 per cent and  
1.5 per cent, respectively, while the fall in bank 
lending is about one and a half times greater and 
the decline in output increases to about 1.8 per cent 





This finding suggests that higher capital makes the 
banking sector more resilient to stress and helps 
dampen the inherent procyclicality of the banking 
system and broader economic cycles.
12 In this hypothetical case, the banking system is exogenously given 
capital for a given degree of asymmetric information between banks 
and their creditors. See Meh and Moran (2010) for a description of this 
experiment.
Source: Adapted from Meh and Moran (2010) 
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bank-capital
Deviation from steady state
b. Capital-asset ratio
Source: Adapted from Meh and Moran (2010) 










Chart 2:  Economic response to a negative shock to
bank capital
Deviation from steady state
a. Output
28
BANK BALANCE SHEETS, DELEVERAGING AND THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SUMMER 2011Countercyclical Capital Buffers 
and the Transmission Mechanism 
of Monetary Policy and Other 
Shocks
The experiments discussed above illustrate that the 
amplification and propagation effects of the bank-
capital channel can be mitigated when the banking 
system is better capitalized. These results are inter-
esting, since the countercyclical capital buffers 
approved under Basel III are intended to reduce the 
procyclicality of the banking system. In doing so, 
however, countercyclical capital buffers will undoubt-
edly affect the behaviour of the financial system and, 
hence, alter the monetary transmission mechanism 
as well.
13 This section analyzes how countercyclical 
capital buffers are likely to affect the transmission 
mechanism of shocks.
14
In principle, countercyclical capital buffers can 
have two benefits. First and foremost, they can 
make financial crises less frequent and less severe 
if they do occur (BCBS 2010a; Bank of Canada 
2010). Second, they can help dampen economic 
cycles.
15 Since Christensen, Meh and Moran (2010) 
abstract from modelling the endogenous occur-
rence of crises, this article focuses only on the 
second benefit. In the experiments that follow, we 
13 Caruana (2011) discusses the conduct of monetary policy in a world 
with macroprudential policy. 
14 Boivin, Lane and Meh (2010) use the same model to examine whether 
monetary policy should be used to lean against the buildup of imbal-
ances.
15 Carney (2011) reviews the benefits of countercyclical capital buffers and 
Basel III.
Chart 3:  Effects of bank capital on the economic response to an adverse productivity shock
Deviation from steady state
Source: Adapted from Meh and Moran (2010) 
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can range within plus or minus 2 percentage points 
around a steady-state capital-asset ratio equal to 
10 per cent.
16 Then, holding the monetary policy rule 
unchanged, we compare outcomes in an economy 






Results from our model-based simulations suggest 
that the extent to which countercyclical capital buf-
fers affect the transmission mechanism depends 
on the nature of the shocks hitting the economy. 
Consider, for instance, (demand-type) financial 
shocks that generate simultaneous downward 
pressures on inflation and credit contractions. An 
example of such a shock is the exogenous nega-
tive shock to bank capital discussed earlier. In this 
case, countercyclical capital buffers and monetary 
policy reinforce each other to simultaneously achieve 
macroeconomic and banking stability. This is illus-
trated in Chart 4. Countercyclical capital buffers 
help to dampen the decline in bank lending; there-
fore, a smaller decrease in the interest rate is needed 
to stabilize inflation and output than in the case with 
no countercyclical capital buffers. This arises since 
bank lending, output and inflation all move in the 
same direction in response to the financial shock. As 
a result, the policy actions required to stabilize the 
economy are associated with a loosening of both the 
countercyclical capital buffer and monetary policy. 
There is thus no inherent trade-off between counter-
cyclical capital buffers and monetary policy when 
the underlying financial shocks act like demand-type 
shocks.
However, when the underlying shocks affecting 
the economy are (supply-type) financial shocks 
that cause credit contractions and upward inflation 
pressures, the effort to stabilize the banking system 
through countercyclical capital buffers may pose 
some challenges to the price-stability objective. 
For instance, excessive pessimism about future 
16 This range is broadly in line with the range of 0 to 2.5 per cent for the 
countercyclical capital buffer recently announced by the regulators 
(BCBS 2010b). 
productivity could lead to credit contractions 
while, at the same time, putting upward pressures 
on inflation (Lorenzoni 2008). This is illustrated in 
Chart 5. Stabilizing credit growth after an adverse 
productivity shock therefore calls for a looser 
countercyclical capital buffer. But loosening the 
countercyclical buffer puts additional upward pres-
sure on inflation, making it even harder for monetary 
policy to control inflation.
17 Indeed, in this case, 
Chart 5 shows that, in the presence of counter-
cyclical buffers, the interest rate must be increased 
more aggressively to combat inflation than in a world 
without countercyclical capital buffers.
Overall, these results suggest that the impact of 
countercyclical capital buffers on the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy and, consequently, 
the nature of the coordination between these two 
tools, depend on the nature of the shocks experi-
enced by the economy. Demand-type financial 
shocks pose no inherent trade-offs between stabil-
izing credit and achieving price stability. In this case, 
the use of countercyclical capital buffers eases the 
pressure on monetary policy, and less-aggressive 
movements in the interest rate would be required 
to achieve economic stability. Supply-type financial 
shocks, however, can generate a tension between 
stabilizing credit and price stability. In this case, 
activating countercyclical capital buffers could make 
it harder to stabilize inflation, and more-aggressive 
movements in the interest rate would be required. 
Under such circumstances, proper coordination 
between the two policy instruments will lead to a 
better policy outcome.
18
17 Loosening the countercyclical capital buffer can cause additional infla-
tion because such loosening increases credit, which, in turn, leads to a 
rise in aggregate demand, causing a further rise in inflation.
18 Countercyclical capital buffers should be considered neither a sub-
stitute for monetary policy nor an all-purpose stabilization instrument. 
Rather, they should be viewed as a useful complement to monetary 
policy in a world in which financial shocks have become an important 
source of economic fluctuations.
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The depletion of bank capital and the subsequent 
deleveraging by banks played an important role 
in the severity of the recent global financial crisis. 
To understand the mechanism behind these phe-
nomena, this article presents a simple macro-
economic framework in which bank capital emerges 
as the solution to an asymmetric-information 
problem between banks and their creditors. One 
finding is that a more-capitalized banking system is 
better able to absorb the effects of shocks on bank 
lending and the economy. Furthermore, counter-
cyclical capital buffers can increase the resilience 
of the banking system to adverse shocks, but, in 
doing so, they also alter the transmission mech-
anism of shocks and monetary policy to the broader 
economy.
Although the research discussed in the article pro-
vides important policy insights, it also abstracts from 
elements that can be important in understanding the 
role of bank capital in the transmission mechanism, 
as well as the implications of countercyclical capital 
buffers for monetary policy. Further research will 
be needed to improve our understanding of these 
issues. For example, more work is required on intro-
ducing crisis dynamics and the resulting non-linear-
ities in macroeconomic models.
19 Another area that 
needs further work is the interaction between various 
macroprudential tools and their implications for mon-
etary policy and the transmission mechanism. For 
instance, what are the interactions between counter-
cyclical capital buffers and more-targeted macro-
prudential instruments, such as the loan-to-value 
ratio for mortgages? And what are the implications 
of such interactions for monetary policy? Finally, 
another important area of future research will be to 
improve our understanding of the determinants of 
liquidity and of the interaction between liquidity and  
the capital positions of financial intermediaries.
19 Woodford (2010) took an interesting first step by introducing an 
endogenous probability of crisis in standard macroeconomic models. 
This reduced-form probability of crisis depends on leverage. See also 
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) who examine endogenous risk taking 
in a macroeconomic model with banking.
Chart 5:  Effects of countercyclical capital requirements following an adverse productivity shock (cont’d)
Deviation from steady state
Source: Adapted from Christensen, Meh and Moran (2010) 
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